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Abstract 
Background: The null hypothesis test (NHT) is widely used for validating scientific 
hypotheses but is actually highly criticized. Assuming a prior distribution on a parameter of 
interest, Bayes' theorem allows the calculation of the a posteriori probability of the 
parameter’s value, conditional on the data. Although Bayesian tests overcome several 
criticisms, some limits remain. We propose a Bayesian two-interval test (2IT) in which two 
hypotheses on an effect being present or absent are expressed as prespecified joint or disjoint 
intervals and their posterior probabilities are computed. The decision to accept one 
hypothesis is based on a probability threshold. The same formalism can be applied for 
superiority, non-inferiority, or equivalence tests. 
Methods: The 2IT was studied for three real examples and three sets of simulations 
(comparison of a proportion and a mean to a reference and comparison of two proportions). 
Several scenarios were created (with different sample sizes), and simulations were conducted 
to compute the probabilities of the parameter of interest being in the interval corresponding to 
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either hypothesis given the data generated under one of the hypotheses. Posterior estimates 
were obtained using conjugacy with a low-informative prior. Bias was also estimated. 
Results: As the sample size increases, the probability of accepting a hypothesis when that 
hypothesis is true progressively increases, tending towards 1, while the probability of 
accepting the other hypothesis is always very low (less than 5%) and tends towards 0. The 
speed of convergence varies with the gap between the hypotheses and with their width. In the 
case of a mean, the bias is low and rapidly becomes negligible. 
Conclusions: We propose a Bayesian test that follows a scientifically sound process, in 
which two interval hypotheses are explicitly used and tested. The proposed test has almost 
none of the limitations of the NHT and suggests new features, such as a rationale for 
serendipity or a justification for a “trend in data". The conceptual framework of the 2-IT also 
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Background 
In the biomedical sciences, extensive use is made of statistical tests when attempting to 
validate scientific hypotheses about a pathological mechanism or a biological phenomenon 
using data collected during an experiment. Indeed, in the absence of access to the population 
of interest for technical, financial and/or ethical reasons, it is on the basis of such 
experimental data that the extrapolation to the population from which these data come, i.e., 
the inference, is made. 
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Since the work of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle [1], scientific knowledge has 
been constructed through deduction and not induction. It is considered that one cannot prove 
a hypothesis but only falsify it. Such falsification is achieved by comparing predicted data 
against the corresponding data observed during the experimentation carried out to test the 
hypothesis. 
The most commonly used technique for making inferences is the null hypothesis test 
(NHT) [2]. The principle of the NHT consists of first posing a hypothesis called the "null" 
hypothesis (H0). In its most common form, this hypothesis states that the parameter of 
interest (a difference in means, a correlation coefficient, etc.) has some reference value, 
generally equal to 0. An experiment is then carried out, and a test statistic (for example, a 
Student t-statistic or a Pearson correlation coefficient) is calculated from the measurements 
made. This statistic is an ad hoc quantity whose distribution is known under the null 
hypothesis (Student's t-distribution in the two previous examples). The probability of 
obtaining a value equal to or greater than the observed value of the calculated statistic is then 
determined (the p-value). If this probability is lower than the commonly agreed-upon 
threshold of 5%, or sometimes less, it is considered that "the statistic is too high". Since the 
corresponding data have nevertheless been observed, it is deduced that the null hypothesis 
cannot be correct, and it is rejected in favour of an alternative hypothesis (H1) specifying an 
effect to be highlighted. 
The NHT in all its forms has recently been the object of quite strong criticisms, both 
on its internal logic and, as a result, on its interpretation. These criticisms are not new, with 
the first of them dating from 1938 [3, 4]; however, beginning in the 1960s [5], then in 1980 
[6, 7], and especially in the last ten years, these criticisms have become more insistent, 
notably following the crisis of reproducibility observed not only in the human sciences but 
also in the biological sciences [8, 9]. The limits of the NHT are indeed numerous. 
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In the biomedical field, the null hypothesis most often cannot be true a priori. It is 
inconceivable, either biologically or mathematically, that a difference in effect will be exactly 
equal to 0 (0.000...). More generally, it is impossible to say statistically that an effect is 
strictly equal to a given value (for example, a difference exactly equal to 2.5 units) since this 
amounts to testing whether a point has some finite thickness. Since a point-like null 
hypothesis can never be validated, it is meaningless to reject it. 
The commonly used form of the NHT is in fact the result of the fusion of two 
incompatible theories, that of Fisher and that of Neyman and Pearson [10]. In this composite 
version of the test, the alternative hypothesis, which is essential to the theory of Neyman and 
Pearson, is often omitted, as proposed by Fisher, and the rejection of the null hypothesis leads 
to the simple acceptance of a difference between the groups, without an alternative 
hypothesis regarding this difference always being clearly specified beforehand. Rejection of 
the null hypothesis thus leads to acceptance of an undefined difference. 
The NHT does not explicitly compare the two hypotheses, which would allow a true 
comparison of the relative merit of each hypothesis according to the observed data. Indeed, 
the test statistic is calculated only under H0 and not under H1. The probability of the data is 
not computed under H1. Therefore, H1 can only be accepted by rejecting H0 because the data  
are judged incompatible with H0, even though we know nothing about the probability of the 
data under H1. 
The p-value is an index that depends on both the effect size and the sample size. Two 
identical p-values can therefore correspond to very different effect sizes, depending on the 
size of the samples, making it impossible not only to directly compare two p-values but also 
to judge the strength of an effect on the basis of the p-value alone. Based on this 
consideration, it becomes absurd to say that the lower the p-value is, the lower the probability 
that H0 is true [11]. The NHT and the confidence interval are both based on a point estimate 
5 
of a parameter and an estimate of the variance of that parameter estimate. This variance is 
large when the sample size is small. Thus, when the sample size is small, the confidence 
interval for the parameter is wide, encompassing values that are not very credible. The width 
of the interval can nevertheless be compatible with a significant test; for example, consider an 
odds ratio (OR) of OR = 2.66 [1.19 - 5.97], p = 0.0175. However, in most realistic situations, 
values within this range that are greater than 3, let alone 4, would not be credible. Thus, a 
significant test on a small number of people suggests that the observed effect is large, but this 
observed value is then a poor estimate of the true value of the parameter because a significant 
test on a small number of people leads to overestimation of the real effect, with effects that 
are too large to be realistic [7]. Depending on the sample size, the test may therefore select 
effects of completely different magnitudes but from the same population. In other words, the 
current use of the NHT tends to define the size of the effect a posteriori in accordance with a 
probability whose value also depends on the sample size and not only on the size of the effect 
itself. The NHT thus allows one to declare the existence of effects that are not explicitly 
sought and, in fact, are mere overstatements of a true effect. To avoid this shortcoming, a 
statistical tool that could separate the influences of the sample size and the effect size would 
be extremely useful for testing hypotheses. 
Another characteristic of the NHT is the arbitrary use of the same decision threshold 
(p = 0.05) in almost all situations. The use of an identical threshold in all cases can lead to 
contradictory conclusions when using a Neyman–Pearson test. A study with a p-value of 0.06 
would conclude that there is no difference and would not reject the null, whereas another 
study testing the same data but with p = 0.04 would reject the null hypothesis, even though 
the confidence intervals would be very close. While this conclusion is understandable in the 
logic of the Neyman–Pearson test, it does not account for the great similarity between these 
two situations in terms of the effect size. 
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The combination of the two limitations mentioned above can lead to absurd 
conclusions. Let us imagine 3 studies evaluating the relationship between an exposure and a 
disease, with the following results: OR1 = 2.66 [1.19; 5.97], p = 0.0175; OR2 = 1.76 [1.00; 
3.08], p = 0.049; and OR3 = 1.62 [0.96; 2.83], p = 0.091. OR1 and OR2 would often be judged 
as leading to the same conclusion regarding the relationship between exposure and disease 
because their associated p-values are close, although their respective confidence intervals 
cover very different value regions. On the other hand, OR2 and OR3 would be considered to 
give opposite conclusions on the basis of the p-value, although their values are close and their 
respective confidence intervals greatly overlap [12]. Such conclusions are found very often in 
the literature, and it would therefore be valuable to have a tool that could avoid or at least 
limit the possibility of contradictory conclusions. Finally, it should be noted that the use of 
confidence intervals instead of p-values, although suggested by many authors, is not a 
satisfactory solution since the p-value and the width of the confidence interval are intimately 
linked [13]. 
By definition, the p-value is the probability of having data that are at least as far from 
what one would expect under H0 as the observed data are. This formulation implies that the 
NHT also considers data that were not, in fact, observed, i.e., all data whose deviations would 
be larger than the deviation observed in the study. When comparing two groups, one with a 
mean of 2 units and the other with a mean of 3 units, we are therefore taking into account not 
only a difference of 1 unit between groups but also differences greater than 1 unit 
(differences of 2 units, 3, 4, etc., up to infinity). It is not clear how something that has not 
been observed could be an argument for or against a given hypothesis. 
These errors in the internal logic of the NHT make it almost useless from a practical 
point of view and at least prevent it from rendering the services expected by its users. Many 
other criticisms have also been levelled against the interpretation of NHT results. For 
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example, it is always possible to design a sample of a sufficient size to reject a null 
hypothesis on the basis of some difference, however small (even if it is clinically irrelevant). 
The current, rogue use of the NHT is mainly to look for significant effects rather than 
necessarily for medically or biologically relevant effects. Another consequence is that the 
user of the test tends to equate a biological effect with a statistical effect, whereas a 
statistically significant effect may, in fact, be biologically insignificant and negligible, as 
revealed by a large sample size. Furthermore, when a result is "non-significant", it is often 
concluded that the sample size was insufficient and lacked power. This conclusion is a fallacy 
because it implies that one knew before the experiment that one could reject H0 and, 
therefore, that a difference truly existed between the populations on which the test was 
performed, even though the test was non-significant. If a difference is known to exist, there is 
no uncertainty about it, and therefore, there is no need to test it. In addition to this (especially 
as a consequence of the previous errors), there are many other possible errors of 
interpretation, more than 20 of which were listed in a paper hosted by the American 
Statistical Association in 2017 [11]. 
Although several authors have well illustrated the limitations of the NHT and its use, 
they have rarely proposed alternative solutions to all these difficulties. For example, a recent 
editorial in Nature [14] called for the elimination of p-values but remained rather vague on 
the procedures to be used to replace them. 
It is often proposed that the p-value should be replaced by the confidence interval, but 
the p-value and the confidence interval cannot be dissociated from each other [13]. The use of 
confidence intervals to perform a test considering the magnitude of the effect has been 
proposed, corresponding to the notion of "magnitude-based inference", notably in 
psychology. However, this method was formulated in a frequentist framework, and the 
intervals are therefore intervals of predicted data, compatible with an effect, and not estimates 
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of the probability that the effect of clinical interest is the correct one. The lack of application 
of the Bayesian methodology makes this approach obsolete [15]. 
Indeed, the NHT itself is based on the frequentist notion of probability, in which the 
probability of an event of interest is conceptualized as the frequency of observation of that 
event in a series of experiments during which the event is likely to occur. The corollary of 
this is that, in frequentist statistics, the parameters of interest (difference in means, etc.) have 
fixed, albeit unknown, values, whereas the data, via repeated sampling, can be used to 
asymptotically approximate the value of a parameter. This has a very important consequence: 
the NHT is, in fact, a prediction of data and therefore of the value of a parameter under H0, 
followed by a comparison of the observed value with this predicted value. The reasoning then 
"works backwards" from this comparison to an inference on the hypothesis formulated with 
respect to the parameter of interest, which leads to confusion between the lack of specificity 
(the type I error risk, i.e., the probability that the test statistic lies beyond the threshold at the 
alpha level under the null hypothesis, since all calculations on the statistic are performed 
under this hypothesis) and the positive predictive value of the test (the probability that the 
alternative hypothesis is true given that the test is significant). 
However, it is the positive predictive value that is of interest to the researcher: who 
would want to know what happens under the null hypothesis that a treatment has no effect? 
The real question is whether the treatment is effective conditional on the observed effect, and 
to answer this question, one must use the data to determine the (subjective) probability that 
the treatment is effective. However, to determine this positive predictive value, one must use 
Bayes' theorem based on a prior probability of each competing hypothesis being true before 
performing the experiment that will generate the data. It is easy to show that a significant test 
does not prejudge the truth of a hypothesis [11], and to overcome this drawback, it would be 
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necessary to have a test procedure that is capable of introducing the a priori probability of 
each hypothesis and thus enabling the use of Bayes' theorem. 
Indeed, the Bayesian construction of a test of a null hypothesis against an alternative 
hypothesis (the complement of the null hypothesis) follows easily from Bayes' theorem. If we 
can decide on an a priori probability of H0 (say p0), then the probability of H1 follows (1-
p0). We observe data for which we can calculate two likelihoods, one under H0 and the other 
under H1. Bayes' theorem then allows the calculation of the a posteriori probabilities of H0 
and H1 given the observed data. The literature then proposes several approaches for deciding 
which hypothesis to accept: essentially, the Bayes factor (BF), the deviance information 
criterion (DIC) and a posteriori probability calculation [16]. 
For example, one can construct a "maximum a posteriori" test [17], in which the 
hypothesis that has the highest a posteriori probability is accepted. A refinement is to 
construct a minimum cost test by assigning a cost to the decision error for each of the two 
hypotheses, similar to the α and β risks of frequentist tests [18]. 
Several authors have proposed the use of the BF as an alternative to the NHT [19], 
but, as has been well described by Kass and Raftery [20], the BF cannot in itself constitute a 
hypothesis test. The BF is the ratio of two likelihoods and is used to compare the relative (and 
only relative) merit of two hypotheses, regarded as two different models. However, regarding 
its use as a statistical test, it lacks any consideration of a priori probabilities, and even a large 
BF in favour of H1 over H0 does not necessarily imply a large posterior probability of H1. 
Bayesian tests overcome several criticisms of the NHT, notably the difficulties of 
interpreting p-values and the invocation of unobserved data. Mengersen et al. [21] provided a 
fairly comprehensive list of measures for quantifying effect size. Furthermore, Makowski et 
al. [22] compared different indices of the existence of an effect in a Bayesian framework. 
However, all these measures are based on both the general principle of the NHT and a point-
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like null hypothesis. Moreover, it is currently a common Bayesian practice to calculate the 
probability that a parameter has a value above (or below) a certain threshold value (of clinical 
significance) from the posterior distribution of that parameter, which has the effect of 
mimicking the p-value of the NHT, including the adverse effect of selecting effect sizes that 
are too large. For example, in an epidemiological study, the credibility interval of the OR is 
typically calculated first, and then, the probability that the OR is greater than 1 (the reference 
value indicating the absence of a difference in effect between the compared groups) is 
calculated. Nevertheless, these tests are still based on the specification of a specific point-like 
null hypothesis and an alternative, complementary hypothesis. As we have already seen, in 
most situations, a point-like null hypothesis is not meaningful. Moreover, the calculation of 
the probability that the parameter has a value greater than a certain reference value leads to 
the selection of extreme values among those that reject the null hypothesis, which are not, in 
fact, very credible but nevertheless participate in the overall inference about the parameter. 
Finally, among the values of the parameter retained by the alternative hypothesis, some are, 
in fact, closer to the value of the null hypothesis than to a central value of the alternative 
hypothesis. This method therefore reproduces one of the limitations of the NHT. It can thus 
be concluded that what remains to be done to break free of the shortcomings of the NHT is to 
relax this constraint of a comparison to a point-like reference value. 
To this end, Kruschke [23] proposed the "region of practical equivalence" (ROPE), 
effectively an interval null hypothesis, which he showed to exhibit good statistical properties. 
However, Kruschke's proposal neglected an important aspect of the test, namely, the 
formulation of the alternative hypothesis. All of the above considerations suggest that the 
alternative hypothesis should similarly be formulated as an interval specifying a "useful" 
effect with relevant values. 
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Within the classical framework, the probability of showing a non-null effect increases 
with the sample size, and the precision of the effect size also increases. Nevertheless, when 
the null hypothesis is rejected, the observed effect size is usually taken as the real value for 
the population, independent of the effect specified in the alternative hypothesis when 
parameterizing the NHT, although it is in fact an estimate of the former. Moreover, this effect 
size is considered the true value after the test, and thus, it cannot truly constitute a test since 
the assumption it is supposed to evaluate is defined afterwards. Although the precision of the 
effect size estimate increases with the sample size, the precision may still be insufficient. 
Finally, the probability that the effect lies in a given prespecified interval does not necessarily 
increase. Since the p-value has a unique value that depends on both the effect size and the 
sample size, it does not allow one to distinguish between the influences of these two factors, 
which significantly limits the interpretation of the results of a study. As Altman and 
Krzywinski [24] said, “any choice of results based on the outcome, rather than on 
prespecified hypotheses, will lead to selection bias”. 
Therefore, it would be useful to have a statistical tool that could unambiguously 
distinguish the role of the sample size from that of the effect size and test whether the effect 
lies in a prespecified interval, as the scientific method demands. The solution to this specific 
part of the problem is also to use a target effect interval. 
We propose here a solution to the problem of hypothesis testing within a fully 
Bayesian framework and under a formulation that eliminates the shortcomings of the current 
methods, either the NHT and its derivatives or the current Bayesian formulation. The 
proposed solution consists of specifying two hypotheses expressed as intervals and 
computing the probability of each of these two hypotheses conditional on the observed data. 
The first hypothesis specifies the interval of values of the parameter of interest that would 
reflect a present and relevant effect, and the second specifies the interval of values that would 
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characterize an absent or negligible effect. In the results section of this paper, the properties 
of this two-interval test (2IT) are presented using simulations. The application of the 2IT is 
illustrated with three examples. The advantages and disadvantages of this method are 
presented in the discussion. 
 
Methods 
In the planning stage of an experiment, scientific considerations make it possible, before any 
data are collected, to formulate a scientific hypothesis that we seek to validate. This scientific 
hypothesis implies the use of a parameter whose value, in the case of the 2IT, lies either in an 
interval that favours the scientific hypothesis or in an interval that disfavours it. These two 
intervals may be complementary or not. The effect sought is thus considered to be either 
present, thus confirming the scientific hypothesis, or absent, thus invalidating the hypothesis. 
These intervals are denoted by HP and HA, respectively, representing ranges of values that 
support either the presence or absence of the effect sought. If θ is the parameter of interest 
(e.g., a difference in means), then the two statistical hypotheses (given the same names as the 
intervals) are: 
𝐻!: 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃!"; 𝜃!#]	and	𝐻$: 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃$"; 𝜃$#] 
where L and U denote the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of each interval. We use LP 
and LA to denote the lengths of these two intervals. 
It is important to note that a "present" effect does not imply a non-zero or high 
parameter value but means that the observed effect is in favour of the scientific hypothesis 
being tested. For instance, equivalence between two treatments will be considered present if 
the effect difference is near 0. 
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The decision to accept HP or HA is based on Bayesian techniques and the comparison 
of the a posteriori probabilities that the parameter value lies in each interval1. The principle 
of the 2IT implies the use of the subjective interpretation of probabilities to enable the 
comparison of intervals of parameter values conditional on the data. Thus, if the scientific 
hypothesis is true and supported by the data, the test will indicate an a posteriori probability 
of the parameter belonging to HP that is much higher than its probability of belonging to HA. 
We set a probability threshold p such that HA or HP will be accepted if Pr(HA|data)≥ p or if 
Pr(HP |data) ≥ p, respectively. Notably, p should be set sufficiently high (p > 0.5) that it is not 
possible to accept both HA and HP. 
We use Pr(HA) and Pr(HP) to denote the prior probabilities of HA and HP and 
Pr(HA|D) and Pr(HP|D) to denote their posterior probabilities. A value of the ratio 
Pr(HP|D)/Pr(HA|D) that is greater than 1 indicates that the data are in favour of HP, and a 
value less than 1 indicates that the data are in favour of HA. It is also possible to calculate 
Pr(D|HP)/Pr(D|HA), the BF [20] for comparing HA and HP. 
The two intervals HA and HP can be joint or disjoint and can be of equal or different 
lengths, and HA can be (entirely) higher than HP or (entirely) lower. The limits of the two 
intervals are determined on the basis of either a theoretical model or bibliographic, 
physiological, physio-pathological or experimental knowledge, the latter of which is the most 
frequent case in the biomedical field. 
With the 2IT, the same formalism can be applied to three classical test situations and 
the respective positions of the two intervals: 
 
1 The details of the calculations used in Bayesian techniques are not recalled here. See [25] or 
[17]. 
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Superiority test: A superiority test is used when the scientific hypothesis being tested 
implies a greater value of the parameter of interest in one group than in another. For example, 
suppose that we wish to show that an experimental treatment E is more effective than a 
reference treatment R by testing whether the survival rate at 12 months with E is higher than 
that with R based on a hazard ratio HR. HP specifies the magnitude of the HR that indicates a 
result in favour of E's clinical superiority, and HP will be accepted if the a posteriori 
credibility interval of HR is included in HP with a probability greater than or equal to p: Pr(q 
Î HP|D)≥ p. The superiority of E will be rejected if Pr(q Î HP|D) < p or if the posterior 
credibility interval of the HR lies entirely within HA with a probability greater than or equal 
to p: Pr(q Î HA|D) ≥ p, where HA defines an HR value interval near 1. 
Non-inferiority test: Suppose that we wish to show that an experimental treatment E is 
non-inferior to a reference treatment R. The HP interval specifies the set of values for which 
we will conclude biological or clinical non-inferiority, and we will conclude non-inferiority if 
Pr(qÎ HP|D) ≥ p. The HA interval specifies the set of values for which we will conclude that 
E is clinically or biologically effectively inferior to R, and HA will be accepted if 
Pr(q Î HA|D) ≥ p. 
Equivalence test: Suppose that we wish to show that an experimental treatment E and 
a reference treatment R led to biological results that can be considered equivalent. The HP 
interval specifies the magnitudes of the differences in parameter values that are in favour of 
the biological equivalence of E and R and therefore tend to support the equivalence 
hypothesis. Such an HP interval will reflect the presence of an equivalence effect by 
specifying values of E - R differences close to 0, within equivalence limits specified a priori. 
We will accept the equivalence hypothesis HP if Pr(q Î HP|D) > p. On the other hand, 
equivalence will not be confirmed and will, in fact, be invalidated if the value of the 
difference between the groups is within the HA interval, which specifies a difference between 
15 
the two treatments that is too great for them to be considered equivalent. We will accept HA, 
i.e., conclude that there is no equivalence, if Pr(q Î HA|D) ≥ p. 
In these three situations, we clearly are concerned with the presence or absence of an 
effect reflecting a scientific hypothesis and not with a null or non-null value of a parameter. 
Specifying HP and HA involves specifying the bounds of the two corresponding 
intervals: θPL and θPU for HP and θAU and θAL for HA. These values can be set independently 
of each other, but a few rules can simplify the process. For example, under the assumption 
that the values in HP are greater than the values in HA, one can set the bounds θPL and θAU to 
the same value. Alternatively, we can set θPL and θAU to be halfway between the central value 
of HP and the central value of HA. We can then fix θPU and θAL on the basis of symmetry 
about the central values of each interval. Of course, this way of proceeding is not necessarily 
the best in all situations, and it is not difficult to imagine intervals of different lengths 
(LP ¹ LA) as well as asymmetric intervals around a target value, depending on the needs of 
the theory to be tested or the scale of the values (logarithmic, for example). 
The lengths of the intervals should be determined by what can reasonably be expected 
to represent a result either disfavouring the scientific hypothesis (for HA) or in favour of it 
(for HP). The width of each interval (LP or LA) quantifies the precision that is expected when 
confirming or refuting the scientific hypothesis. The credibility interval of the parameter of 
interest should therefore ideally be entirely contained within HP or HA to confirm or reject the 
scientific hypothesis being tested. The narrower the HP and HA intervals are, the more strict 
the test, but the more informative and decisive the conclusion on the scientific hypothesis. 
The qualities of the 2IT were studied in three situations: estimation of a proportion, 
comparison of two proportions and comparison of a mean to a reference. In each situation, 
scenarios were created to reproduce the case in which HP was true or HA was true. 
Simulations were conducted to estimate the probabilities of concluding HP (the proportion of 
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times within the set of simulations that the a posteriori credibility interval of the parameter 
was entirely included in the HP interval) when HP was true and when HA was true, and similar 
simulations were conducted for HA. Thus, for each of the three situations and for each value 
of N, the empirical probabilities Pr(HP|HP), Pr(HA|HP), Pr(HP|HA), and Pr(HA|HA) were 
estimated. The a posteriori estimates were obtained in a conjugation situation (parameter of a 
binomial distribution or comparison of the parameters of two binomial distributions) or in a 
pseudo-conjugation situation (mean of a normal distribution). 
 
A proportion 
Several scenarios were simulated. The assumption HA of no effect was set to 4 different 
values of the reference proportion p, where p Î {0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}. The assumption HP of an 
effect was set to p + d, with d Î {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. For each of the 12 scenarios, the sample size 
was increased from 10 to 1000 in steps of 10 (Figures 1-3). 
In each scenario, the width of each interval was the same for both hypotheses and 
centred on the value of pX. A binomial distribution B(N, pX), where X = A or P, was assumed 
for the data. 
We computed the exact probabilities of p lying in HA and HP conditional on HA and 
HP being true, i.e., Pr(HP|HP), Pr(HA|HP), Pr(HP|HA), and Pr(HA|HA), using a Jeffreys 
Beta(0.5, 0.5) prior distribution. 
 
Comparison of two proportions 
For the comparison of two proportions, p1 and p2, between two groups, two situations were 
studied: a superiority test and an equivalence test. In the superiority test, p1 was set to 0.5, 
and p2 was set to 0.5 (representing no difference, HA) or 0.7 (representing a difference, HP). 
In the equivalence test, p1 was set to 0.5, and p2 was set to 0.5 in the presence of equivalence 
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(HP) or to 0.7 in the absence of equivalence (HA). The number N per group was varied from 
20 to 800 for each group. In both cases, the HA and HP intervals were set to a width of 0.2 and 
centred on p1 - p2, i.e., corresponding to the interval [-0.1, 0.1] or [0.1, 0.3]. Due to the 
principle of the 2IT itself, the superiority and equivalence tests are in fact perfectly 
symmetrical; thus, the results are shown only for the superiority test, as the conclusion for the 
equivalence test is exactly the same, with the labels A and P permuted on each index. 
A binomial likelihood was assumed for the distribution of a phenomenon in two 
populations, with true proportions P1 and P2. The a priori knowledge of these proportions 
was modelled according to Beta distributions with parameters of 0.5 and 0.5 (Jeffreys prior). 
The posterior distributions were therefore Beta distributions with parameters of 0.5+Xi and 
0.5+Yi, where Xi and Yi are the numbers of "successes" and "failures", respectively, in 
population i Î {1; 2}. Xi and Yi were simulated using a binomial distribution Bin(N, P1) or 
Bin(N, P2). The a posteriori distribution of each proportion was estimated by assuming a 
Beta distribution for each proportion, using the conjugation property of Beta distributions 
with a Beta(0.5, 0.5) Jeffreys prior. The distribution of each a posteriori proportion was then 
obtained by drawing 100,000 random values from the ad hoc Beta a posteriori distribution, 
and a corresponding sample of 100,000 differences was then computed, of which the 2.5th 
and 97.5th percentiles were used to construct the bounds of the credibility interval of the 
difference of the two proportions. 
We accepted the hypothesis HP (HA) if the probability of theta lying in the HP (HA) 
interval was greater than 0.95. 
 
Comparison of a mean to a reference 
A reference value of µ = 0 was assumed. Data were simulated under the assumption that the 
effect is present if the mean is µ = 1 (HP) and the effect is absent if the mean is µ = 0 (HA). 
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The interval width was set to 1 unit, centred on 0 for HA or on 1 for HP. For each situation, 
the number of simulations was 2000. The sample size N was increased in increments of 10 
from 30 to 1000. In each iteration, the posterior mean and its credibility interval were 
estimated. HP or HA was accepted if the a posteriori credibility interval was entirely included 
in the HP interval (from 0.5 to 1.5) or in the HA interval (from -0.5 to 0.5), respectively. For 
each value of N, the empirical probabilities of accepting HP and HA conditional on HP and HA 
were calculated. 
The a posteriori mean was calculated under the assumption of an unknown variance 
[25], with a normal distribution of mean μ0 = 0 or 1 with the unknown variance set equal to 3 
(with an a priori pseudo-sample size of 1). Random samples of size N were obtained from a 
normal distribution of mean 0 (under HA) or 1 (under HP). 
The a posteriori mean µn is then: 
𝜇% =	
(𝜅& 𝜎'⁄ 	)𝜇& + (𝑛/𝜎')𝑦4
𝜅& 𝜎'	⁄ + 𝑛 𝜎'⁄
	 




7𝜈&𝜎&' + (𝑛 − 1)𝑠' +
𝜅&𝑛
𝜅%
(𝑦4 − 𝜇&)': 
where 𝑦4 is the observed mean of the sample, 𝜅& is the number of prior observations for the 
mean, 𝜈& is the number of prior observations for the variance, 𝜇& is the prior mean, n is the 
sample size and 𝜅% = 𝜅& + 𝑛. 
 
Use of the 2IT in three situations from the literature 
The 2IT was also applied to three examples from the literature, the first involving the 
estimation of a relative risk (RR), the second involving the comparison of two means, and the 




In the work of Hajek et al. [26], a sample size was explicitly computed, making it easy to 
specify both assumptions in the 2IT. The goal of the study was to evaluate the 1-year efficacy 
of refillable e-cigarettes compared with nicotine replacement when provided to adults seeking 
help to quit smoking and combined with face-to-face behavioural support. The primary 
outcome was 1-year sustained abstinence. The sample size of 886 was calibrated to 
demonstrate an RR of 1.7 (23.8% abstinence rate in the e-cigarette group vs. 14% in the 
nicotine replacement group) with a power of 95%. 
 
Example 2 
McCann et al. [27] compared the neurodevelopmental outcomes at 5 years of age after 
general anaesthesia or awake-regional anaesthesia in infancy in an equivalence study. Their 
hypothesis was that there would be no clinically important differences in neurodevelopmental 
outcomes between general anaesthesia and regional anaesthesia. This was expressed as an 
expected range of equivalence of +- 5 points in the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence (WPPSI-III) Full Scale Intelligent Quotient (FSIQ) at 5 years. 
 
Example 3 
The 2IT can also be used to confirm a lack of difference when one might be observed. In a 
therapeutic trial, it is traditional to check that randomization has fulfilled its intended role by 
verifying the balance of the main characteristics of the subjects between groups. It is 
therefore expected that in 95% of cases, the difference between the groups will be non-
significant. A non-significant test is most often interpreted as showing no difference, as a lack 
of evidence of difference [11], which is often misinterpreted as evidence of no difference. 
Zhang et al. [28] ran a trial comparing two chemotherapy regimens for recurrent or metastatic 
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nasopharyngeal carcinoma in phase 3 trials. Table 1 in their paper compares the rates of 
subjects with recurrence with distant metastases at inclusion. The goal is to check that the 




Results of the simulations 
The performance of the 2IT was evaluated in three inference situations: estimation of one 
proportion, two proportions, and an average. Although these are three different situations, the 
overall findings are the same and are given in the next paragraph. The specific differences in 
each situation are described in a later paragraph. 
For simplicity, we adopt HX and HY to denote the hypotheses HA and HP. The text 
should be read the same way for both cases. For example, in the case of one proportion, if pA 
= 0.5 and pP = 0.7, Pr(HP|HP) is the same curve as Pr(HA|HA) with pA = 0.7 and pP = 0.5, and 
vice versa. The curves in Figure 1b are therefore inverted with respect to the curves in Figure 
1a. 
 
General conclusions, valid for all three situations 
The probability of accepting Hx when Hx is true, Pr(Hx|Hx), progressively increases as the 
number of samples increases, tending towards 1. The probability of accepting HX when HY is 
true, Pr(HX|HY), is always very low (less than 5%) and tends towards 0 as the sample size 
increases. The classification error rate is therefore very low and quickly becomes negligible. 
When the sample size is low, we most often conclude that there is a lack of power because 
the a posteriori credibility interval is wider than the target width, and the probability of 
accepting Hx when Hx is true is also very low. This effect confirms the ability of the 2IT to 
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distinguish between a lack of power and a low sample size. The exact performance depends 
on the assumptions made about the values under HA and HP. Thus, the speed with which 
Pr(HX|HX) converges to 1 varies with the gap between θA and θP and with the widths of HA 
and HP. However, the general pattern of the conclusions as described above is valid 
regardless of the situation. All of these conclusions are valid regardless of the widths of the 
HX and HY hypothesis intervals and regardless of the gap between qX and qY. Only the rate of 
power growth and the gap between the levels of power for each assumption vary from one 
situation to another, while the general pattern is perfectly identical. 
 
Specific conclusions for each situation 
 
For a proportion 
The results for one proportion (Figures 1-3) were obtained using the exact formulas. In these 
simulations, intervals of equal length were specified for HA and HP. HX is accepted with a 
higher probability than HY when pX is farther away from 0.5 than pY is. This effect is 
expected in that the variance of a proportion depends on the value of that proportion, 
decreasing as the proportion moves away from 0.5. The power for Hx will therefore be 
greater the farther the proportion specified in Hx is from 0.5. Thus, in Figure 1, the curve 
representing Pr(HX|HX) rises faster and earlier than the curve for Pr(HY|HY) when pY is 
farther from 0.5 than pX is. The effect is more important the larger the difference between pX 
and pY is. When pA and pP are symmetrical with respect to 0.5 (for instance, 0.45 and 0.55), 
the probabilities of accepting HA and HP grow at the same rate, and the curves of Pr(HX|HX) 
are perfectly superimposed.  
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Note that these configurations can correspond to both the case in which we are testing 
for equivalence (HA: |pX - pY| ≥ d and HP: pX - pY < d) and the case in which we are testing 
for a difference (HA: pX = pY and HP: pX ≠ pY).  
 
For two proportions 
The specific conclusions for the comparison of two proportions (Figure 4) are identical to 
those for the case of one proportion. The variance of the difference between two proportions 
depends on the value of each proportion, and the closer the proportions are to 0 or 1, the 
smaller the variance. The power for HX (Pr(HX|HX)) therefore increases faster than the power 
for HY (Pr(HY|HY)) when HX specifies a difference that is farther from 0 than HY does. The 
situation is reversed when HX specifies a difference closer to 0 than HY does. When the 
absolute deviation from 0 is the same for HX and HY, the power curves match perfectly (these 
results are not very informative and thus are not shown). 
For example, when pA = 0 (zero difference between the two proportions) and pP = 0.2, 
the power for HP is greater than the power for HA. 
 
For a mean 
The general results described above are again found here. In particular, the power for HX 
increases as the sample size increases, and the risk of false positives or false negatives is 
virtually zero (Figure 5). In the case of a mean, the question of possible biases on the mean 
and variance arises. The simulations show that the bias on the mean is non-existent, with the 
sample mean being centred on µX regardless of whether HX is accepted. The details of this 
bias for N = 250 (figure 6) and N = 700 (figure 7) further show that the means of the samples 
retained under HX are centred on µX in a unimodal distribution. The non-retained samples are 
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also centred on µX but in a bimodal distribution with, as expected, no means close to µX; 
instead, the means of the samples are located towards the edges of the HX interval. 
Concerning the variance, as with the NHT, one could expect that the HX|HX 
conclusions would be partially linked to the selection of biased samples with lower-than-
expected variances. Simulations have shown that this bias is present but of a magnitude 
similar to that found for the NHT and that the larger the sample size is, the smaller the bias. 
Table 1 to 4 shows the magnitude of the bias on the mean and the variance as a function of 
the sample size. The results that lead to the acceptance of HX under the assumption that HX is 
true have, on average, a smaller variance than expected. However, this bias is small and tends 
to be negligible in situation where the probability to accept HA or HP exceeds approximately 
30%. 
 
Results for the three examples 
 
Example 1 
For the example of Hajek et al. [26], using the 2IT formulation allows us to define two target 
intervals. In this context, the difference assumption (HP) may be conveniently defined around 
the expected RR. Considering that the RR scale is not linear, the upper and lower HP target 
bounds are defined as exp(log(1.7) / 2) = 1.30 and exp(log(1.7) + log(1.7) / 2) = 2.22, 
respectively. The HA interval is defined as [exp(-log(1.7) / 2) = 0.77; exp(log(1.7) / 2) = 
1.30]. These intervals are asymmetrical around their expected RR values on the exponential 
scale but symmetrical on the log RR scale. The observed results reported by Hajek were 
79/438 (18%) and 44/446 (9.9%) successes in the e-cigarette and nicotine replacement 
groups, respectively. The observed RR was 1.83 (1.30 - 2.58), p<0.001. Using the two 
interval hypotheses specified above with uniform priors, the probability that the observed RR 
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is in HP is 0.849, and the probability that the observed RR is in HA is 0.028. The "missing" 
probability arises because the RR confidence interval is not centred on the target of 1.7, with 
the observed upper bound being larger than the HP upper bound. The HP probability shows 
that although the data are roughly in favour of the hypothesis of an effect, the assumption 
implied by the RR specified for the sample size computation is only weakly supported, with a 
probability of 0.849. Nevertheless, this hypothesis is 30.3 times more credible than the 
equivalence hypothesis. More data are thus necessary to ascertain that the real effect is an RR 
of 1.7 within the HP margins, although the assumption of a larger success rate with the e-
cigarette is credible. It must be stressed that the higher values in the confidence interval, 
above 2.22, are considered too large on prior grounds, despite showing a positive effect, and 
are thus less credible. The values above 2.22 indeed support an effect but do not support an 
RR of 1.7. One last point to be made regarding this example is that the probability ratio of 
30.3 is larger than the 0.95-to-0.05 ratio that could be expected from a classical point of view, 
even though the probability of the most probable hypothesis is only .849. This suggests that 
HA can be ruled out, while HP still needs further data to be ascertained. Finally, there is some 
evidence of plausibility for a larger effect than the one defined in HP, but to test this claim, a 
new hypothesis must be established and specifically investigated in a new study, perhaps 
using the actual HP [1.30; 2.22] as an alternative hypothesis to be confirmed. 
 
Example 2 
In the 2IT formulation, the assumptions of McCann et al. [27] are expressed as HP: -5 < mean 
FSIQ difference < 5 and HA: |mean FSIQ difference| ≥ 5. The cited study observed a mean 
(sd) FSIQ of 99.08 (18.35) in one group and 98.97 (19.66) in the other group, with a mean 
difference of 0.23 [-2.59 - 3.06]. Using low-informative priors, the mean difference was 
evaluated as 0.10 [-3.39; 3.64], Pr(HA) = 0.005, Pr(HP) = 0.995, and Pr(HP)/Pr(HA) = 199; 
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thus, using a probability ratio threshold of 100, for instance, the prespecified equivalence can 
be considered present and is thus confirmed. 
 
Example 3 
In Zhang et al. [28], the rates of subjects with recurrence with distant metastases at inclusion 
were 131/181 (72%) and 119/181 (66%) in the gemcitabine group and in the fluorouracil 
group respectively. A non-significant Fisher test was interpreted as proof that the two groups 
were balanced on this criterion. 
However, if we consider that a difference of proportion d of at least 10% is reasonably 
suggestive of an imbalance, then the conclusion is different. In the 2IT formalism, the 
presence of imbalance is specified as HP: |d| > 10%, and the absence of imbalance is specified 
as HA: |d| < 10%. Using a uniform prior, the probability of HA, i.e., that the between-group 
difference is within the [-10; +10] % interval, is only 0.764. Here, again, the non-significance 
of a test p-value was taken as a sign of no effect, and the effect size was not even specified, 
while there was in fact a probability of 0.237 of a proportion difference larger than 10%, 
suggesting the presence of imbalance. 
In the same paper, the proportions of subjects rated with an Eastern Cooperative 
Oncology Group (ECOG) performance status of ECOG 0 in the two treatment groups were 
59/181 (33%) and 62/181 (34%). The Fisher exact test p-value was 0.824. Considering here 
again that a difference of at least 10% between the groups is relevant, with the same HP and 
HA as before and using a uniform prior, the HA probability (that the between-group difference 
is within the [-10; +10%] interval) is 0.947, which is suggestive of real balance between the 
treatment groups in terms of this criterion. 
 
Consistency of results: return to the example of ORs 
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In the introduction, we presented an example of three studies evaluating the relationship 
between an exposure and a disease in the form of an OR, with two examples of contradictory 
conclusions when comparing two of the three ORs. The use of the 2IT suppresses this type of 
contradiction. 
Let us recall the results of these three studies: 
• OR1 = 2.66 [1.19; 5.97], p = 0.0175	
• OR2 = 1.76 [1.00; 3.08], p = 0.049	
• OR3 = 1.62 [0.96; 2.83], p = 0.091	
Let us set HA = [0.9; 1.1] and HP = [1.1; 2.95], with a target OR of 1.8. Note that the 
HP interval is symmetrical on the log scale around log(1.8), which explains the asymmetry of 
this interval on the OR scale. Under a mild a priori assumption on the prior distribution of the 
OR (that it is located within the interval of [1/20 - 20]), the associated results of the same 
three studies are: 
• OR1 = 2.75 [1.16; 5.62], Pr(HP) = 0.018, Pr(HA) = 0.631	
• OR2 = 1.80 [1.00; 3.01], Pr(HP) = 0.053, Pr(HA) = 0.918	
• OR3 = 1.66 [0.92; 2.78], Pr(HP) = 0.090, Pr(HA) = 0.895	
These results are perfectly consistent with each other and with the HP and HA 
hypotheses. The first two ORs give results that are weakly consistent with each other (unlike 
the NHT results) and provide different levels of support to HA, whereas the last two ORs, 
which were considered discordant according to classical methods, are now highly consistent, 
with the Pr(HP) values being very close to each other and providing similar support to this 




We propose here a new way to perform a statistical hypothesis test. This test is formulated 
entirely in a Bayesian framework, and it explicitly considers two competing hypotheses, each 
expressed as an interval. Both hypotheses are explicitly used in the test procedure. At the end 
of the test, the probability of each hypothesis is obtained, which allows them to be compared 
unambiguously by quantifying the support for each hypothesis provided by the data, as 
allowed by Bayesian theory. The test thus produces a conclusion about each hypothesis. The 
proposed test has almost none of the limitations of the NHT and is therefore an interesting 
alternative to the NHT and a possible improvement to the inferential process in statistics. 
Moreover, it bypasses the limitations of other procedures formulated in either a classical 
frequentist or Bayesian framework that have been proposed as alternatives to the NHT. 
Compared to the NHT, the 2IT restores an epistemological reality that is intellectually 
more satisfying because it allows one to affirm something in order to demonstrate its 
existence rather than affirming it by rejecting something else that seems not to be real. 
Moreover, as some scientific statements imply an absence of an effect, we provide here a way 
to formulate a solution to statistically support either the presence or the absence of an effect 
within a unified framework. 
Regardless of the situation explored (one or two proportions or a single mean), our 
simulations show that the operational characteristics of the 2IT are satisfactory. The power of 
the test increases with the sample size, while the probability of falsely concluding the wrong 
hypothesis is small even for small sample sizes. The probability of accepting either HX (HA or 
HP) when HX is true increases as the sample size increases, and the probability of accepting 
HX when HY is true rapidly becomes very small. 
The 2IT has a number of advantages. In contrast to the NHT, the 2IT does not 
guarantee that the hypothesis of an absence of an effect will necessarily be rejected if the 
sample is sufficiently large. One cannot sample to the point of "proving" one's favourite 
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hypothesis, unlike in the NHT. One must instead reach sufficient precision for at least one of 
the two hypotheses or choose to stop including subjects, which is quite relevant and feasible 
in the context of Bayesian control of sequential analyses. When stopping before reaching the 
expected sample size and before either HA or HP is accepted, the conclusion will be that the 
sample is simply too small to warrant any conclusion. This makes it possible to distinguish a 
lack of power from an absence of an effect. 
As it is based on Bayesian theory, the 2IT respects the principle of likelihood, which 
eliminates the paradoxes observed with the NHT, particularly in cases of multiple 
comparisons or sequential analyses [29]. Moreover, no extreme result is selected, and there is 
therefore no bias in the estimation. More precisely, the bias observed is of limited magnitude, 
decreasing as the sample size increases, and is of the same order of magnitude as that 
observed with conventional methods. 
Various Bayesian or non-Bayesian methods using at least two intervals have also been 
proposed previously. 
The method of Shih et al. [30], an extension of that of Goeman et al. [31], consists of 
a 5-region test for an OR. One of the regions corresponds to a negligible effect, and the other 
4 regions correspond to moderate or large effects in favour of or against the exposure factor. 
However, the presented method is implemented entirely with a frequentist approach and 
therefore shares the numerous limitations of frequentist methods. Moreover, in the case of an 
OR, one of the intervals is an open interval extending up to infinity, which necessarily has the 
disadvantage of being able to select extreme effects, especially on small samples, most often 
falsely. Finally, its procedure is complex, with no fewer than 9 different possible conclusions. 
The interpretation is also complex and easily confused, especially since it only exacerbates 
the difficulties of interpretation of classical tests without providing a solution to the 
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fundamental problem of hypothesis testing. Moreover, Ng [32] showed the limits of this 
method from a Bayesian point of view. 
Campbell and Gustafson [33] proposed a conditional equivalence test, performed 
conditionally to the significance of a superiority test performed first. The two hypotheses to 
be tested therefore do not have the same status, and it is possible to have a non-significant test 
and then conclude both non-superiority and non-equivalence. This test shares all the defects 
of frequentist tests. 
In the 2IT, as in the case of the ROPE [23], the HA hypothesis plays the role of the 
usual NHT null hypothesis, but it expresses the absence of the effect implied by the 
hypothesis in the form of an interval. This makes it possible to support this absence of effect 
since it does not take the form of a point-like value, which can never be exactly matched. 
However, the ROPE neglects the important aspect of the formulation of an alternative 
hypothesis. In the NHT, the alternative hypothesis is usually taken to be the complement of 
the null hypothesis. However, this often implies the consideration of implausible parameter 
values, such as an OR of 100 or 50. For small effects, as often observed in epidemiology, 
even an OR greater than 3 may be highly unlikely. This suggests that the alternative 
hypothesis should similarly be formulated as an HP interval specifying a relevant effect. A 
high probability of this HP hypothesis will tend to confirm it and thus support the presence of 
the effect sought. 
The definitions of HP and HA and their associated lengths induce the possibility that 
the a posteriori credibility interval of the parameter of interest may be very precise, of a 
length less than both LA and LP but not entirely included in either HP or HA and therefore 
such that Pr(q Ì HX) < p. This interval thus concentrates the values of the parameter in a 
zone of high probability at an unexpected location. In this way, the existence of a third zone 
is defined, which we will call ZS. ZS is not associated with any scientific hypothesis since it 
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has not been specified before the experiment. Its existence leaves room for an unexpected but 
nevertheless plausible and precise result, allowing us to evoke serendipity (hence the S of ZS) 
to generate a new hypothesis that can then be formally tested via the 2IT in a new 
experiment. In this situation, in a manner somewhat similar to the classic use of the NHT, a 
hypothesis will be defined a posteriori from an interval of effect values with a high 
probability. Therefore, when faced with a conclusion of the ZS type, it is essential to validate 
the result by defining a priori a hypothesis to be validated in a new study and then calculating 
the probability of the effect reflected by this hypothesis, a hypothesis that will itself be 
confirmed or refuted in a "classic" 2IT. It is also assumed here that we are operating in a 
Bayesian framework in each stage of the process, with inclusion of the previous results in the 
a priori distribution for the second experiment. The hypothesis to be validated will express 
values close to those observed in ZS, possibly modified or adapted to accommodate external 
knowledge that could refine the theory on ZS. 
The 2IT formulation finally gives meaning to the expression "a trend was observed in 
the data". Very often, when a result approaches significance but does not reach it, the authors 
speak of a "trend". This term is ambiguous in the context of the NHT because, as stated in the 
introduction, the NHT as it is commonly used is, in fact, a mixture of the Neyman–Pearson 
method, in which there is no place for the notion of a trend, and the Fisher method, in which a 
trend can be given a meaning. There are a great variety of formulations of this notion of a 
trend, but they all aim to express the idea that the hoped-for result has been approached but 
not yet reached; in general, such a conclusion is drawn in relation to p-values of 
approximately 0.10. We must remember here one of the major flaws of the NHT, namely, 
that it uses a p-value that dichotomizes the result into either the presence or absence of an 
effect, partly independently of the size of that effect, to define as present an effect size that 
has not been defined prior to experimentation and, therefore, without prejudging the size of 
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this effect. There can thus be no trend in the result, or perhaps only a trend towards 
significance, which, as we have seen, should not be confused with the effect size. As the p-
value does not quantify the effect size, the notion of a trend is not relevant. 
On the other hand, the 2IT allows us to make sense of this notion. Indeed, as HP and 
HA specify an effect size, the closer the a posteriori probability of HP is to 1, the more likely 
the effect. When this probability is significant but not high, we can speak of a trend, since this 
trend will be defined by a level of certainty about the presence of an effect specified prior to 
the experiment. It is not a trend in the size of the effect, which is a target and therefore cannot 
change according to the data, but rather a trend in the level of certainty of an assertion about 
HP. Insofar as the 2IT imposes a definition of the effect size sought before an experiment is 
carried out, when neither HP nor HA is supported and when the width of the interval of the 
parameter exceeds the target value, one can clearly say that the analysis lacks "power", if this 
notion can have any meaning in Bayesian methods. Here, again, insofar as the effect size is 
disconnected from the probability associated with it, the lack of an effect can clearly be 
linked to a too-small sample size. 
To facilitate the analysis of test results in Bayesian inference, Mengersen et al. [21] 
has provided a list of indicators that quantify the probability of observing an effect of a 
certain magnitude. We cite here several measures of general interest: the estimate of the 
between-group difference, the credibility interval of this difference, the effect size measured 
by Cohen's d, the probability that Cohen's d exceeds a minimum value of clinical interest, and 
the predicted value for an individual in each group. However, here again, there is no explicit 
mention of two hypotheses specified before the study was carried out, much less of a 
comparison of two intervals, one specifying a negligible effect and the other a significant but 
reasonable effect, reflecting the expected effect. These measures are therefore extremely 
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interesting, but they would be much more relevant when expressed within the 2IT framework 
and its definition of the hypotheses to be compared in the form of intervals. 
With the 2IT, the question arises of how to choose the bounds of each interval. While 
the examples developed here illustrate two different ways of defining the bounds of the two 
hypotheses, others are also possible. However, whether the intervals are symmetrical or not, 
of identical or different lengths, joint or disjoint, defined by a physical theory or on the basis 
of expert opinion, the way in which these bounds are set is undoubtedly less important than 
the fact that these bounds must be set upstream of the experiment in order to support a 
confirmatory, and not merely exploratory, scientific scheme. 
Once the experiment has been performed, the probabilities that the parameter of 
interest lies in the HP and HA intervals, i.e., Pr(HP|D) and Pr(HA|D), respectively, are 
calculated. These two probabilities can be compared in terms of their difference or, better, 
their ratio Pr(HP|D)/Pr(HA|D). The higher this ratio is, the more strongly HP is supported. The 
closer this ratio is to 0, the more strongly HA is supported, and the less HP is supported, such 
that HP can be considered invalid. The comparison of this a posteriori ratio to the a priori 
ratio, Pr(HP)/Pr(HA), allows us to estimate the BF, which quantifies the contribution of 
information from the data [20]. 
Whether we use the difference or the ratio, we are not proposing here to set a 
reference value as the decision threshold, as this would probably lead to the bad habit of 
always using the same threshold for all situations, which is obviously unwise. One cannot 
judge the promise of an anticancer drug using the same threshold as for evaluating the 
promise of a cold treatment or the role of a protein in the reproduction of fungi. That said, 
end users are often required to make decisions about whether to do something, such as a 
doctor who needs to decide whether to administer a treatment. Such binary decisions must be 
made on a case-by-case basis, by consensus within the learned societies. Any decision should 
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therefore be made by the end user of the test statistic, not the statistician. Finally, a single 
scale for all situations would be absurd because the costs of the relevant decision errors differ 
greatly from one situation to another. 
In the presentation of the method here, although it is explicitly and entirely based on 
Bayesian principles, we have not discussed in detail the role of the a priori distribution of the 
parameter of interest on the test conclusions. While the definition of an a priori distribution is 
essential to the formulation of the 2IT, which is based entirely on the Bayesian conception of 
statistical testing, the choice of this distribution has no influence on the underlying concept of 
the 2IT. 
A "complete" Bayesian approach would also encompass the inclusion of a risk 
function in the 2IT. The use of such a risk function has not been developed here, but like the 
a priori distribution, this risk function does not modify and is not modified in any way by the 
2IT principle. 
The 2IT is able to distinguish between evidence of absence and absence of evidence, 
whereas the latter is often mistaken for the former with the NHT. With the 2IT, the absence 
of evidence is manifested by an excessively wide a posteriori credibility interval, while the 
evidence of absence is manifested by a confirmation of HA. The 2IT also makes it possible to 
move beyond excessive concern with a significant test. This term, associated from the start by 
Neyman and Pearson and by Fisher with the demonstration of an expected effect, has 
perverted the use of statistical tests by giving the impression that only a significant test, 
rejecting H0, is interesting. This is particularly clear in the Neyman–Pearson framework. 
With the 2IT, either result, HA or HP, can be affirmed at an agreed-upon risk, and thus, even a 
test concluding the absence of an effect can be classified as significant. Finally, a non-
significant test will be simply and solely a test with insufficient power to affirm either the 
presence or absence of the effect sought. It will no longer be possible to confuse absence of 
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evidence with evidence of absence, without needing to invoke significance. This method is 
therefore likely to greatly change the attitude of researchers regarding their publication 
strategies [34]. 
This paper presents the general principle of the proposed 2IT. Future work will focus 
on how to use this 2IT for sample size calculations, in the context of predictive probabilities, 
and in sequential analyses. Finally, the very concept of the 2IT makes it particularly useful in 
a meta-analysis. 
Finally, the 2IT avoids the interpretative errors of the NHT and will probably be much 
easier to understand by non-statisticians, who are, after all, the final users of statistical tests. 
Because the 2IT directly concerns Bayesian inference and the specification of relevant 




In the current context of intense discussions about the limitations of the null hypothesis test 
(NHT), many alternatives have been proposed, but these different proposals all have 
limitations and are quite impractical to use for some. It seems important to us to propose an 
alternative that could answer all, or at least a large part, of the criticisms that are levelled 
against these procedures. Our proposal seems to us to be the most complete one that is 
possible while providing a framework that is both simple and consistent with the needs of 
typical users of statistical tests. Recent discussions have even suggested a "ban" on p-values 
in science. This ban, even if it would lead to the hoped-for result, namely, the abandonment 
of a procedure that ultimately makes little scientific contribution, would nevertheless be 
difficult to implement in the absence of an efficient alternative. Bayesian methods, as they are 
often used at present, are also not entirely satisfactory because they do not completely follow 
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Bayesian concepts and instead sometimes attempt to mimic the principles of the NHT at the 
cost of preserving some of its shortcomings, in particular, threshold effects and the selection 
of extreme results based on an a posteriori observation of an effect not explicitly specified 
before the experiment. Moreover, it is not clear which authority would be able to enforce 
such a ban. On the other hand, it seems to us that our tool, because of its relevance and 
simplicity of use, would render the NHT de facto null and void, which would lead to its 
disappearance through practice rather than through a regulation that would not have much 
legitimacy in our scientific field in any case. 
The proposed two-interval test (2IT) is thus a new alternative to the classical NHT in 
which the two hypotheses to be compared are explicitly stated and used in a consistent 
probabilistic framework, namely, Bayesian theory. Moreover, the 2IT provides a formal 
framework for serendipity. The conceptual framework of the 2IT also allows the calculation 
of a sample size and the use of sequential methods and can be adapted to numerous contexts. 
Although the use of this method remains to be described for more complex models 
(multivariate models, mixed models, and the Rasch model, for example) and particular 
situations (multiple comparisons, for example), as the proposed method is based on Bayesian 
theory, there are no conceptual difficulties but only, possibly, technical difficulties in the 
application of the 2IT to these models or situations. 
The 2IT method is simple, straightforward, statistically sound and easy to implement. 
It is an alternative to both null hypothesis testing and tests of significance. It offers scientists 
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Appendix 
The whole approach of the 2IT can easily be summarized as follows: 
Insert in the text: the summary of the procedure: 
- Identify the endpoint, the associated random variable, the analysis model and the 
parameter of interest q in the model	
- Define the hypotheses of the presence and absence of the effect to be tested, HP and 
HA, by indicating for each hypothesis the central value and the lower and upper 
bounds of the interval defining the hypothesis	
- Define the a priori distribution of the q parameter, fit the model, and estimate the 
point-like and posterior interval values of q	
- Compute the a posteriori probabilities that q lies in the HP and HA intervals	
- Compare the values of the two probabilities Pr(HP|D) and Pr(HA |D) by either their 
difference or their ratio	
- Look for possible serendipity by comparing the length LS of the q credibility interval 
with the lengths of HP and HA (LS < LA or LS < LP)	
- Conclude: HP, HA, serendipity, or insufficient power	
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Table 1: Bias for the mean and the standard-deviation for N = 120.  
Table 2: Bias for the mean and the standard-deviation for N = 150. 
Table 3: Bias for the mean and the standard-deviation for N = 200. 




N = 120 n mean standard-error 
  [2.5% - 50% - 97.5%] [2.5% - 50% - 97.5%] 
HA 17 [9.96 - 10.01 - 10.02] [2.51 - 2.66 - 2.77] 
not HA 1983 [9.45 - 9.99 - 10.53] [2.65 - 3.00 - 3.41] 
HP 20 [10.97 - 11.00 - 11.03] [2.47 - 2.64 - 2.74] 
not HP 1980 [10.44 - 10.98 - 11.52 ] [2.65 - 3.00 - 3.41] 
Table 1 
 
N = 150 n mean standard-error 
  [2.5% - 50% - 97.5%] [2.5% - 50% - 97.5%] 
HA 152 [9.95  - 10.00 - 10.04] [2.53 - 2.84 - 3.05] 
not HA 1848 [9.54  - 10.00 - 10.48] [2.66 - 3.00 - 3.33] 
HP 144 [10.95 - 11.00 - 11.06]   [2.59 - 2.87 - 3.07] 
not HP 1866 [10.52 - 11.00 - 11.49] [2.66 - 3.01 - 3.37] 
Table 2 
 
N = 200 n mean standard-error 
  [2.5% - 50% - 97.5%] [2.5% - 50% - 97.5%] 
HA 592 [9.90 - 10.00 - 10.09] [2.68 - 2.97 - 3.23] 
not HA 1408 [9.56 - 10.00 - 10.47] [2.72 - 3.00 - 3.31] 
HP 636 [10.90 - 11.00 - 11.09] [2.67 - 2.96 - 3.24] 






N = 400 n mean standard-error 
  [2.5% - 50% - 97.5%] [2.5% - 50% - 97.5%] 
HA 1678 [9.81  - 10.00 - 10.19] [2.77 - 2.99 - 3.20] 
not HA 322 [9.62 - 10.21 - 10.38] [2.80 - 3.01 - 3.21] 
HP 1651 [10.81 - 11.00 - 11.19] [2.78 - 2.99 - 3.20] 






Figure 1. For a single proportion, the probabilities of accepting HA or HP when HA or HP is 
true, as functions of the sample size, for different scenarios in terms of the true values of qA 
and qP. The intervals HA and HP are 0.1 units wide. 
Figure 2. For a single proportion, the probabilities of accepting HA or HP when HA or HP is 
true, as functions of the sample size, for different scenarios in terms of the true values of qA 
and qP. The intervals HA and HP are 0.2 units wide. 
Figure 3. For a single proportion, the probabilities of accepting HA or HP when HA or HP is 
true, as functions of the sample size, for different scenarios in terms of the true values of qA 
and qP. The intervals HA and HP are 0.3 units wide. 
Figure 4. For the difference between two proportions, the probabilities of accepting HA or HP 
when HA: d = 0 or HP: d = 0.2 is true, as functions of the sample size. The intervals HA and 
HP are 0.1 units wide. 
Figure 5. For a single mean, the probabilities of accepting HA or HP when HA: qA = 0 or HP: 
qP =1 is true, as functions of the sample size. The intervals HA and HP are 0.5 units wide. 
Figure 6. For a single mean, estimation of the bias on mean and variance for samples 
selected in HA or HP or not. The intervals HA and HP are 0.5 units wide. N = 250. 
Figure 7. For a single mean, estimation of the bias on mean and variance for samples 
selected in HA or HP or not. The intervals HA and HP are 0.5 units wide. N = 750. 
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